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NOTES AND COMMENT
The foregoing decisions clearly indicate that it is now the rule in
the state of Washington, that prior conviction of any crime may
be shown to affect the credibility of the witness. The Overland case
defines a crime as an act or omission forbidden by law, and punishable by death, imprisonment, fine, or other penal discipline.'
This includes feloies, and misdemeanors, crimes malum in se, and
malum prohi-bita, and crimes of the crimen falss. In other words,
crimes of any nature may be shown.
In conclusion, it may be said that there is no objection to the
present rule except perhaps the fact that some crimes have no bearmg whatsoever on the veracity of a witness. An individual may
have been convicted of a crime, and yet may be an honest witness. For example, one may have been convicted for violation of
a parking ordinance. Minnesota, whose statute on this subject
was also a prototype 9 for our sec. 2290, has refused to permit
traffic convictions under city ordinances to be shown.20 It would
seem that a crime of this nature should not effect the veracity of
the person so convicted. Yet under the present rule in Washington, such a conviction could perhaps be shown to affect the crediELmER GOERING.
bility of the witness.

SoE AsPEPTS OF REGULATIONS OF FEDERAL REsERVE BOARD AND
STATE STATUTES AUTHORIZING FoRwARDiNG OF CmcKS FOR CoILEcTIOm DIRECT TO DRAwEE BANKS AND ACCEPTANCE OF DRAFTS iN
PAYMENT-The regulations of the Federal Reserve Board author-

ize federal reserve banks in handling checks and other negotiable
instruments forwarded to them for collection to forward them
direct to the banks on which drawn and accept the drawees' drafts
in payment.'
Statutes have been enacted in California, Colorado, Montana and
Oregon authorizing banks doing business in those states to forward
checks and other negotiable instruments received for collection
direct to the2 banks on -which drawn and accept the drawees' drafts
in payment.

These regulations and statutes were enacted
effect of the decision of the Supreme Court of
in the case of Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy,3
Supreme Court of the United States held that a

to counteract the
the United States
in which case the
former regulation

"Note 6, supra.
2

°See note 11, supra.

*4Carterv. Duluth Yellow Cab Co., (Minn.) 212 N. W 413; see also
Neal v. United States (C. C. A. 8th), 1 F (2d) 637, where the municipal
ordinance cases are discussed and the Washington cases inferentially
criticised.
LRegulation J, Series of 1928, superseding Regulation J, Series of 1924.
2 Laws of California, 1925, c. 312, sec. 5,
Laws of Colorado, 1925, c. 64,
p. 172; Laws of Montana, 1925, c. 63, p. 85, Laws of Oregon, 1925, c. 207,
sec. 126. p. 360.
' 264 U. S. 160, 44 Sup. Ct. 296, 68 L. ed. 617 (1924).
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of the Federal Reserve Board merely authorizing federal reserve
banks to forward checks and other negotiable instruments direct
to the banks on which drawn did not authorize them to accept
in payment drafts drawn by the drawee banks or anything but
cash or currency
It is a well settled rule that the drawer of a check is discharged
the moment the check is presented to the drawee, the drawee having sufficient funds to the credit of the drawer and being ready
to pay in cash, and that if the owner surrenders the aheck in exchange for something other than cash or currency which turns out
to be worthless the loss will fall upon him.4
And it has been held by the Supreme Court of Montana that this
rule is not changed by a statute merely authorizing the collecting
bank to forward the check direct to the drawee and to accept the
drawee's draft in payment without providing that the liability
of the drawer of the check will continue until the drawee's draft
has been paid.
It is therefore apparent that if a bank forwards a cheek to a
federal reserve bank or bank authorized by statute to forward it
direct to the bank on which drawn and accept the drawee's draft
m payment, and that bank forwards the check direct to the drawee
and accepts the drawee's draft in payment, and the draft is not
paid owing to the intervemng insolvency of the drawer, a loss arises
which will fall not upon the drawer of the check but upon the
owner or some bank that accepted the check for collection.
The owner of the check may be the original depositor, the depository bank or an intermediate bank, depending upon eircumstances.
It is a well settled rule that where a check is unrestrictively indorsed by the holder and deposited with a bank and credit entered
upon the account of the depositor, title to the check, m the absence
of agreement to the contrary, immediately passes to the bank.5 If
that bank indorses the check without restriction and forwards it to
another bank with instructions to credit its account with the
amount, the title to the check will pass to the second bank.8 Therefore, if a depository bank located in this state accepts a check for
collection under circumstances passing title to it, and forwards it
to a federal reserve bank or bank doing business in a state having
a "direct to drawee" statute, and that bank forwards the check
direct to the drawee and accepts the drawee's draft in payment,
and the draft is not paid owing to intervening insolvency of the
drawer, the loss will fall upon the depository bank.
It would also seem that the courts may hold that the loss will
'Anderson v. G4ll, 79 Md. 312, 29 AtI. 527, 25 L. R. A. 200 (1894)
Noble v. Doughten, 72 Kan. 336, 83 Pac. 1048, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1167
(1905).
5
Vickers v. Machinery Warehouse Co., 111 Wash. 576, 191 Pac. 869
Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 25 Sup. Ct. 243, 49 L. ed.
(1920)
Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank, 271 U. S. 489, 46 Sup. CL
482 (1905)
584, 70 L. ed. 1051 (1926) Noble v. Doughten, see note 4, supra.
I Noblev. Doughten, see note 4, supra.
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fall upon the depository bank or an intermediate bank though that
bank was not the owner of the instrument.
In many jurisdictions the rule prevails that each bank through
winch a check passes in the process of collection contracts to collect
the check and is responsible for the defaults of its agents (the socalled "New York" rule). Tins is the rule of the federal courts,?
and probably the rule in this state.
If each bank through winch a check passes in the process of collection contracts to collect the cheek (not merely to exercise due
diligence in collecting the check), it would seem that if a depository bank (especially if it is not a federal reserve bank) accepts a
check for collection under circumstances not passing title to it and
forwards the cheek to a federal reserve bank or bank doing business in a state having a "direct to drawee" statute and that bank
forwards the cheek direct to the drawee- and accepts the drawee's
draft in payment, and a loss arises as the result -of this method
of collection, neither the regulations of the Federal Reserve Board
nor the "direct to drawee" statute under the authority of which
the cheek was forwarded direct to the drawee would protect the
depository bank from liability
Even if the courts of this state follow the so-called "Massachusetts" rule, that each bank through winch a cheek passes in the
process of collection undertakes only to exercise due diligence in
selecting another suitable collecting agent, or tins rule is adopted
by the parties by contract, the courts may hold when the question
arises that a bank is negligent in forwarding an item for collection to a federal reserve bank or bank doing business in a state
having a "direct to drawee" statute without forwarding instructions not to forward the item direct to the drawee.
In a few jurisdictions the owner of a check has a preferred claim
upon the assets of the drawee bank where the check was forwarded
direct to the drawee bank with instructions to remit and that bank
remitted by draft and became insolvent before the draft was
paid."
A large majority of the courts winch have passed upon the question, however, have held that the owner does not have a preferred
claim upon the assets of the drawee bank.9
The situation is one that demands the serious attention of the
banks. A contract between a depository bank and its depositor
authorizing the forwarding of checks direct to the banks on winch
'Exchange Bank v. Third Bank, 112 U. S. 276; 5 Sup. Ct. 141, 28 L. ed.
722 (1884) Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, see note 3, supra., Douglas
v. Federal Bank, see note 5, supra.
8
Federal Reserve Bank v. Peters, 139 Va. 45, 123 S. E. 379 (1924)
Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh, 313 Mo. 412, 281 S. W 733 (1926).
'Ryer Gran Co. v. Amercan Security Bank, 147 Wash. 42, 264 Pac.
1000 (1928) Heckler Milling Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 242 Mass.
181, 136 N. E. 333 (1922) State v. McKinley County Bank (N. M.) 252
Pac. 980 (1927) Rainwater v. Federal Reserve Bank, 127 Ark. 631, 290
S. W 69 (1927)
See Paton's Digest, (1926) sec. 1451a.
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drawn and the acceptance of drafts in payment would afford the
bank considerable protection, but of course would not protect the
bank where it was the owner of the instrument forwarded for collection. The remedy seems to be the enactment in every state in
the Union of a statute giving the owner of the paper a preferred
claim upon the assets of the insolvent drawee bank. In the meantime banks should forward their items for collection with instrnctions that they must not be forwarded direct to drawee banks.
ROBERT W

REID.

RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILES -

NEGLIGENCE -

DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITIES. -

Hickey,

owner of an automobile, met Bullock, and together they had two or three
drinks of intoxicating liquor. Thereafter, Hickey notifed the man in
charge of his car to allow Bullock to have it at any time. Hickey -wentto
his home, after which Bullock returned, took the car, met the plaintiffs
and invited them to ride to a restaurant with him. Bullock, over the protests of the plaintiffs, began speeding. After going four or five blocks, the
automobile struck an iron button in the street, careened into a pole and
seriously injured the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued both the driver and the
owner of the car. Held, that one given to drinking intoxicating liquor
must be regarded as an unsafe and a potentially incompetent and dangerous
driver, and that the owner of an automobile who knows of such habits and
intrusts his automobile to such a driver may be liable for resulting injuries
to third persons. Trotter v. Bullock, 148 Wash. 516, 269 Pac. 825 (1928)
The instant case is decided chiefly on the authority of Crowell v. Duncan, 145 Va. 489, 134 S. E. 576 (1926) and Mitchell v. Churches, 119 Wash.
547, 206 Pac. 6 (1922) both of which rest upon the doctrine that a person
who loans his automobile to one who he knows uses intoxicants, is liable
for injuries resulting from the negligence of the driver while under the
influence of liquor.
Automobile are not be classed with such highly dangerous agencies as
dynamite or ferocious animals, and are not dangerous per se. Moore v.
Rode ie, 106 Wash. 548, 180 Pac. 879 (1919). In Mitchell -v. Churches, 119
Wash. 547, 206 Pac. 6 (1922), it was held that while an automobile is not
a dangerous instrumentality, yet it may become such in charge of one
known to be incompetent by reason of addiction to intoxicants. In Dixon
v. Haynes, 146 Wash. 163, 262 Pac. 119 (1927) it was held that where a
drunken servant is driving a truck load of coal in the business of the master, the master is liable for a wrongful death which is the proximate result
of the servant driving an automobile even though the master had no
knowledge of his intoxication. The foregoing case involves the direct
liability of a master to a third person for the act of an intoxicated servant,
and rests squarely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior in the application of which knowledge of the master is not an essential factor. Cases
like the instant case, however, in which the permissive use of an automobile is granted to another, do not rest upon any master-and-servant or
principal-and-agent relationship; they rest rather upon the theory that
one must not knowingly subject third parties to persons or instrumentalities which under certain circumstances may become dangerous. In this
respect an analogy may be found in the general principle of the common
law sustaining the liability of a master to a servant injured by the negligence of a fellow servant, who the master knew or had reasonable grounds
to believe was incompetent.
K. G. S.
BILLS AND

NOTES---CHECKS-FRAUDULENT

INDORSEMENT-LIABIL'rIY

OF

PAYING BANK.-One C., while acting as bookeeper and cashier of the plaintiff corporation, without authority, indorsed checks payable to the corpora-

